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Article: 
In this paper I shall draw a distinction between what I shall call remote and immediate moral obligation. The 
distinction sheds light on the issues of whether "ought" implies "can" and of whether there can be any genuine 
moral dilemmas, but it also calls for a qualification in the usual account of what it is for an obligation to be 
overridden. 
 
I. "OUGHT" AND "CAN" 
The thesis that "ought" implies "can" has been challenged in many ways. One challenge concerns the matter of 
what I shall call self-imposed impossibility. A typical case of such impossibility is that of someone who makes 
it impossible that he repay a loan on Sunday by gambling away all his money on Saturday night. Many 
philosophers have taken this sort of case to show that "ought" does not imply "can" because the person in 
question ought to repay the loan but cannot.
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 This diagnosis strikes me as far too hasty. Let us say that the 
person (call him Smith) promised to repay the loan on Sunday. Then, certainly, it seems that it may well be 
right to say that Smith ought to have repaid the loan—and here I use "ought" in that sense which characterizes 
what Ross called an obligation or duty proper (as opposed to a prima facie obligation or duty), for it is with this 
sense that I shall be primarily concerned in this paper. And certainly it seems right to say that he could not repay 
the loan (once he had gambled his money away). But neither observation suffices to show that "ought" does not 
imply "can." 
 
It has become a common practice to ascribe a double time-index to "can"-contexts—one to the "can" itself and 
one to the action on which the "can" operates. This is a useful practice. Thus, we may say that I can now be in 
Boston tomorrow although, if I embark this evening on a trip to the Far East, I may put the possibility of my 
being in Boston tomorrow out of reach. In general, we may say that, in the phrase-form "S can at T do A at T'," 
the "can" is immediate if T is identical with T' but remote otherwise. (We may assume that, in the latter case, T 
is earlier than T'.) It seems to me plausible to say that "can (remote)" is analyzable in terms of "can 
(immediate)," but I shall not press this.
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 All I wish to do here is make explicit note of the fact that "cans" and 
"cannots" may be remote, in the sense that some non-immediate futures are open to me now while others are 
not. 
 
Now, if "ought" implies "can" and if "cans" can be immediate or remote, then we should expect "oughts" to be 
classifiable as either immediate or remote. And I suggest that we say just this. That is, I suggest that we ascribe 
a double time-index to "ought"-contexts and accept the propriety of the phrase-form "S ought at T to do A at 
T'," in which the "ought" may be said to be immediate if T is identical to T' but remote otherwise. The thesis 
that "ought" implies "can" may then be seen to be the thesis, more precisely stated, that "S ought at T to do A at 
T'" implies "S can at T do A at T'."
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 And the question now is: does the acknowledged phenomenon of self-
imposed impossibility show this thesis to be false? 
 
The answer seems clearly to be that it does not. On the contrary, the thesis helps explain what I think we want to 
say about the case, and that is the following.
4
 Prior to the Saturday night gambling, Smith ought to repay the 
loan on Sunday. After he has gambled away all his money so that he can no longer repay the loan on Sunday, it 
is not true to say that Smith ought then to repay the loan on Sunday. On the contrary, Smith is then faced with 
new options and his obligations change accordingly. (Just what these new options and obligations are will 
depend on details of the case that I have not provided.) It of course remains true to say on Monday that Smith 
ought to have repaid the loan on Sunday, for what this amounts to saying is that there was a time T such that 
Smith ought at T to repay the loan on Sunday. It is also true to say on Monday that Smith could not have repaid 
the loan on Sunday, if this is taken to mean that there was a time T such that Smith could not at T repay the loan 
on Sunday, but not if this is taken to mean that there was no time T such that Smith could at T repay the loan on 
Sunday. 
 
It is crucial to this way of viewing things that we see remote wrongs—that is, violations of remote obligations—
to be genuine wrongs, just as immediate wrongs are; indeed, they are wrongs which are often morally no less 
important than immediate wrongs. Now, it does seem true that, whenever a remote wrong is committed, an 
immediate wrong is committed also, but this does not undermine what I have just said. For instance, when 
Smith does the remote wrong of not repaying the loan on Sunday, he also does the immediate wrong of 
gambling away his money on Saturday night. Indeed, it seems correct to say that, in some sense, the remote 
wrong is committed by virtue of the immediate wrong's being committed. (The remote wrong would not have 
been committed—then and there—had not the immediate wrong been committed.
5
) But this is not to give any 
sort of moral primacy to the immediate wrong. On the contrary, in the present case it seems fair to say that such 
primacy rests with the remote wrong; that is, in some sense, it is wrong for Smith to gamble away all his money 
on Saturday night because it is wrong for him not to repay the loan on Sunday. (The gambling would not have 
been wrong had not the failure to repay the loan been wrong.) Thus, self-imposed impossibility affords no 
excuse. I shall have more to say on this issue in Section III. 
 
There is a flip-side to the problem of self-imposed impossibility; we may call it the problem of self-imposed 
necessity. Some philosophers hold that "ought" implies not only "can" but "can avoid." More precisely, their 
view is that "S ought at T to do A at T'" implies "S can at T do other than A at T'." This view seems quite 
plausible to me, especially when it is coupled with an account of "ought" according to which, to put it roughly, 
one ought to do the best one can.
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 For those things which one does of necessity are, a fortiori, among the things 
that are the best that one can do. Without the thesis that "ought" implies "can avoid," then, one is in danger of 
being committed to accepting that we all ought to travel more slowly than light, not high-jump twenty feet, and 
so on. 
 
Now, if "ought" does imply "can avoid," the problem of self-imposed necessity arises. A typical case of such 
necessity is that of someone (call him Jones) who makes it necessary that he keep his promise to be in a certain 
room at 10:00 by entering that room at 9:45, locking the door, and throwing away the key. If Jones knows 
himself to be weak-willed and likely to renege on his promise other-wise, his action of throwing away the key 
may be laudable. Indeed, let us suppose that, if he did not throw away the key, Jones would not keep his 
promise; then, if he ought to keep his promise, he ought also to throw away the key. But does it follow, by 
virtue of "ought" implying "can avoid," that we may say at 11:00 that it is not the case that Jones ought to have 
kept his promise? Of course not. The solution by now should be obvious. We should, I submit, say the 
following: Jones ought up to 9:45 to keep his promise at 10:00; Jones ought up to 9:45 to throw away the key at 
9:45; it is not the case that Jones ought after 9:45 to keep his promise at 10:00. Thus, at 9:45, Jones satisfies two 
obligations, one immediate and the other remote; and it is in virtue of this remote obligation that we may say at 
11:00 that Jones ought to have kept his promise. 
 
II. MORAL DILEMMAS 
By a "moral dilemma" I mean, not a conflict of prima facie duties, but a conflict of duties proper. More 
precisely, someone S is faced with a moral dilemma, in the present sense, if he ought at T to do some action A 
at T' but also ought at T not to do A at T'. This very way of putting things, with the explicit use of a double 
time-index, exposes a possibility that seems to me heretofore not to have been adequately appreciated by those 
who have discussed moral dilemmas, namely, the possibility that S ought at T to do A at T' but also at T* (a 
time distinct from T) not to do A at T'. Such a conflict of duties proper does not constitute a moral dilemma in 
the present sense; let us call such a conflict a moral bind. 
 
Many philosophers have thought that there can be moral dilemmas.
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 This contention seems to me to be false; it 
is a contention that has recently been cogently criticized by Earl Conee.
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 But, while there cannot be moral 
dilemmas, there can, I think, be moral binds. In the course of his critique of moral dilemmas Conee overlooks 
this important fact. One of the most plausible reasons for thinking that there can be moral dilemmas concerns 
the emotion of guilt. One argument that Conee considers may be reconstructed as follows:
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(A)  (1) It is appropriate for someone to feel guilty about doing A [or not doing A] only if he ought not 
[or ought] to have done A. 
(2) It is possible both that it would be appropriate for someone to feel guilty about doing A (were he 
to do it) and that it would be appropriate for him to feel guilty about not doing A (were he not to do 
it). 
Therefore  
(3) It is possible both that someone ought to do A and that he ought not to do A. 
 
Conee's response to this argument is in effect the following. On one understanding of "appropriate" (A1) is true 
but (A2) false, while on another under-standing (A2) is true but (A 1) false. In the former case "appropriate" is 
to be understood in what Conee calls its objective sense, while in the latter case it is to be understood in its 
subjective sense. He clarifies this as follows: feeling guilty is objectively appropriate (or appropriate to the 
facts) just in case one is guilty; feeling guilty is subjectively appropriate just in case one believes that one is 
guilty. 
 
Clearly, if one is to reject the possibility of moral dilemmas and one understands the conclusion (A3) of the 
foregoing argument to express the contention that there can be moral dilemmas, one must reject at least one of 
the premises of that argument. If both premises seem plausible, then it is prudent to proceed as Conee has done 
and to try to isolate two senses of some key term, show that the premises are plausible only if the term is used in 
both its senses, and thereby show that the argument fails due either to its having at least one false premise or to 
its relying on equivocation and thus being invalid. But there is another, instructive way to deal with the 
foregoing argument; it is possible to accept both premises, even where "appropriate" is used univocally, and 
thus accept the conclusion, but to accept it only on the understanding that it expresses the contention that there 
can be moral binds (and not moral dilemmas). 
 
To make this point clear, we need to render explicit the time-indices suppressed in version (A) of the argument. 
If all of statements (1) - (3) are to be acceptable when this is done, the argument must, I think, read as follows: 
 
(B)  (1) It is appropriate for someone to feel guilty at T3 about doing A [or not doing A] at T2 only if he 
ought not [or ought] at some time T to do A at T2 . 
(2) It is possible both that it would be appropriate for someone to feel guilty at T3 about doing A at 
T2 (were he to do it then) and that it would be appropriate for him to feel guilty at T3 about not doing 
A at T2 (were he not to do it then). 
Therefore 
(3) It is possible both that someone ought at some time T to do A at T2 and that he ought at some 
time T not to do A at T2. 
 
In reaching this conclusion one must understand "appropriate" in its objective sense, for otherwise (B1) would 
be false. (That is, I am here assuming that one is guilty of doing something only if one ought not to have done 
it.
10
) 
 
It is extremely important to distinguish (B3) from the following sentence, which expresses the contention that 
there can be moral dilemmas: 
 
(C) It is possible that there be a time T such that someone both ought at T to do A at T2 and ought at T not to 
do A at T2. 
 
In (C) the quantifier over times has broad scope, and the time of "ought" is thus said to be identical with the 
time of "ought not." This is not the case in (B3), which would be true if the following could be true: 
 
(D) S ought at T0 to do A at T2 and ought at T1 (a time distinct from To) not to do A at T2. 
 
(D) expresses a moral bind, not a moral dilemma. 
 
While I shall not argue for the claim that there cannot be moral dilemmas, I think that it is easy to see that there 
can be moral binds. Suppose that Green promises on Friday to help Black move furniture on Sunday, and 
suppose that this promise gives rise, not just to a prima facie duty, but to a duty proper on Friday to help Black 
on Sunday. But suppose that Green later wrongfully puts him-self in a position such that some more urgent task 
needs attending to on Sunday. Suppose, for instance, that he abducts White at noon on Saturday and that, as a 
result, he has a duty proper after noon on Saturday to return White unharmed on Sunday—a task which will 
require him to forgo helping Black. This seems to me all perfectly possible. The following constitutes a partial 
moral summary of the situation: Green ought on Friday and Saturday morning to help Black on Sunday; Green 
ought on Friday and Saturday morning not to abduct White at noon on Saturday; Green abducts White at noon 
on Saturday; Green ought on Saturday afternoon and Sunday to return White on Sunday; Green ought on 
Saturday afternoon and Sunday not to help Black on Sunday. Thus, by doing wrong on Saturday, Green has put 
himself in a moral bind. 
 
Two points are noteworthy here. First, the case just presented is, like that in which Smith gambles away his 
money, a case where a remote wrong is or would be done by virtue of an immediate wrong's being done. Here 
the remote wrong is Green's not helping Black on Sunday (remote because the "ought" which is violated ceases 
to apply before Sunday arrives); the immediate wrong is Green's abducting White on Saturday (immediate 
because the "ought" which is violated applies on Saturday). In this case, as opposed to the earlier case 
concerning Smith, there is some reason to deny that the remote wrong has moral primacy over the immediate 
wrong. This is because, while it is true that Green's abducting White is wrong because of his obligation to help 
Black, the abduction is wrong for other reasons also. Indeed, it is these other, independent reasons which make 
it possible for Green to take on a new obligation not to help Black. But, just as with the case of Smith's 
gambling, the question of which wrong (if any) has moral primacy has no bearing on the fact that both 
immediate and remote wrongs are genuine wrongs. 
 
Secondly, it is precisely because Green both ought on Friday and Saturday morning to help Black on Sunday 
and ought on Saturday afternoon and Sunday not to help Black on Sunday that it can be objectively appropriate 
for him to feel guilty on Monday about helping Black, were he to do so, and also objectively appropriate for 
him to feel guilty on Monday about not helping Black, were he not to do so.
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 Thus, we may go even further 
than Conee acknowledges in accommodating the data that proponents of moral dilemmas wish to accommodate, 
but without, in the end, accepting the possibility of such dilemmas. 
 
III. THE OVERRIDING OF OBLIGATION 
The foregoing account of remote obligation pre-supposes the propriety of saying that Smith has a duty proper 
on Friday to repay the loan on Sunday, that Green has a duty proper on Friday to help Black on Sunday, and so 
on. And some may balk at this. They may say: Green's duty to help Black is overridden on Saturday by a duty 
not to help Black; this shows that the duty to help Black was merely prima facie at best. But I deny that this 
shows anything of the sort. 
 
Notice that Green's duty to help Black resembles Smith's duty to repay the loan, in that both are generated by a 
promise; if Green's duty is merely prima facie, it seems that Smith's duty must be merely prima facie also. But if 
so, then Smith will have done no full-fledged wrong, but merely a prima facie wrong, in not repaying the loan, 
and so we cannot say on Monday that he ought to have repaid it (where "ought" here expresses a duty proper), 
and we cannot reproach him for not having done so, and so on. But we can reproach him for not having done so, 
for his failure to repay the loan is a full-fledged wrong. And so Green's failure to help Black (should he fail to 
do so) appears to be a full-fledged wrong also, even though his obligation to help Black is overridden. 
Of course, we could try to distinguish the cases in this way: we could say that Smith's duty to repay the loan 
becomes a duty proper at the moment that he gambles his money away but that Green's duty to help Black never 
becomes a duty proper. But I can find no plausibility in this suggestion. On the contrary, it seems to me that 
what we should say is the following. Both Smith's duty and Green's duty are duties proper on Friday and 
Saturday. Both obligations are superseded on Saturday. 
 
Green's duty, indeed, is overridden by a duty not to help Black. At the moment it becomes overridden, it of 
course ceases to be a duty proper; but this does not imply that it never was a duty proper. Thus the usual 
account of what it is for an obligation to be overridden must be qualified slightly. The usual account, as I 
understand it, is this: in any situation there may be several conflicting prima facie duties; at most one of these is 
a duty proper; where there is a duty proper, all the other conflicting prima facie duties are overridden and 
thereby relegated to the status of being merely prima facie; only the violations of duties proper constitute full-
fledged wrongs; violations of a duty that is merely prima facie constitutes a wrong that is merely prima facie. 
As far as it goes, this account seems to me acceptable. But it does not go far enough. The qualification that is 
called for is simply this addition: a duty, once overridden, is merely prima facie; but a duty may become merely 
prima facie and need not always have been so. 
 
This picture of overriding is compatible with the claim that all duties start out life as duties proper and that some 
of them remain duties proper all their lives, while others get overridden and become merely prima facie. This is 
an intriguing claim, but I think it inaccurate. It seems to me perfectly possible that a duty should be overridden 
immediately at its inception, so that it never attains the status of duty proper but remains forever in the nether 
world of duties that are merely prima facie. (Perhaps a promise made simultaneously to two people to do two 
incompatible things would generate such a duty.) This picture of overriding is also compatible with the claim 
that a duty, once overridden, may rise from the depths and become a duty proper. This, too, is an intriguing 
claim and seems, moreover, to be accurate. If at T1 I am under a prima facie obligation to be in Chicago at T4 
but also under a more stringent prima facie obligation to be in Los Angeles at T4, then my obligation to be in 
Chicago is overridden. But sup-pose that, in order to be in Los Angeles at T4, I must catch a plane at T2, while, 
in order to be in Chicago at T4, I need only catch a plane at T3. Then, if I fail to catch the relevant plane at T2, 
my obligation to be in Chicago at T4 may well become a full-fledged duty, a duty proper. 
 
I have said that both Smith's obligation to repay the loan on Sunday and Green's obligation to help Black on 
Sunday are superseded on Saturday. I have also said that Green's obligation is overridden then. I have not said 
the same of Smith's. It seems to me useful to distinguish types of supersession. One type is that of overriding, 
where the obligation that is superseded survives, even though as merely prima facie. Another type of 
supersession is that of suppression (as I shall call it), where the obligation that is superseded becomes extinct 
(but not by means of being fulfilled). Smith's obligation is sup-pressed rather than overridden. But Green's 
obligation is overridden; one measure of this is that even on Saturday afternoon we may ascribe to him the 
conditional obligation to help Black on Sunday if he fails to return White on Sunday (while no corresponding 
conditional obligation to repay the loan on Sunday seems ascribable to Smith on Saturday afternoon). 
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The question arises: when does the failure to do what one once had a duty proper to do constitute full-fledged 
wrongdoing? In the cases of Smith and Green, the failure to do on Sunday what they once had a duty proper to 
do constitutes full-fledged wrongdoing. But, it may be remarked, not all failures to do what one once had a duty 
proper to do are of this sort. It depends on how and why the duty proper was superseded. Had Smith not 
gambled on Saturday but been robbed instead, or had the obligee waived repayment, then his obligation to 
repay the loan on Sunday would have been sup-pressed just the same; but in not repaying the loan on Sunday he 
would have done no wrong. Had Green not abducted White but been confronted with the opportunity to return 
him nonetheless, then his obligation to help Black would have been over-ridden just the same; but in not 
helping Black on Sunday he would have done no wrong. 
 
The proper response to this remark seems to me to be to deny that it is accurate. If, as I believe, what one ought 
to do is the best that one can do, then it seems to me that we should say the following. If Smith could have 
avoided being robbed or having the repayment waived, then, if he was obligated to repay the loan, he ought not 
to have put himself in a position where these things happened (regardless of how blameless he might be for 
having done so); whereas, if he could not have avoided these things, then he never was (despite initial 
appearances) obligated to make the repayment in the first place. Similarly, if Green could have avoided being 
confronted with the opportunity to return White, then, if he was obligated to help Black, he ought to have 
avoided the confrontation (regardless of how blameless he might be for not having done so); whereas, if he 
could not have avoided the confrontation, then he never was (de-spite initial appearances) obligated to help 
Black in the first place. Thus, I would say, all failures to fulfill a remote obligation are in fact cases of remote 
wrongdoing. 
 
But I recognize that this conclusion will appear unpalatable to many. After all, I have not argued for the claim 
that one ought to do the best one can or for the claim that this thesis has the implications that I have just noted, 
and I grant that it seems odd to say that Smith has an obligation not to be robbed and that Green has an 
obligation not to be con-fronted with the opportunity to return White. There is some reason, then, to think that a 
proper account of remote obligation would require drawing a distinction between the violation of such an 
obligation (so that a remote wrong is committed) and the mere failure to fulfill such an obligation (so that no 
wrong is committed). But I do not know what this account would or should look like in detail, although it is 
clear that it would require something like the following to be appended to the account of remote obligation 
already given. First, a distinction must be drawn between what may be called genuine and mock moral binds. 
The former are binds where the agent will have done wrong no matter what he does; the latter are binds where 
the agent will have failed to fulfill an obligation, but will not necessarily have done wrong, no matter what he 
does.
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 Second, an obligation may be said to be cancelled if it is superseded prior to fulfillment, but superseded 
through no wrongdoing on the part of the obligor. If such cancellation is possible, then we must qualify the 
claim, made in Section I, that to say on Monday that Smith ought to have repaid the loan on Sunday is simply to 
say that there was a time T such that Smith ought at T to repay the loan on Sunday. To avoid being misleading, 
we must rather claim that to say the former is to say that there was a time T such that Smith ought at T to repay 
the loan on Sunday and this obligation was not cancelled at any time thereafter. 
 
Now, to repeat, I do not believe that the cancellation of obligation is possible, and I believe that all binds are 
genuine. But, whether or not I am right in this, the following two observations must, I think, be accepted, and 
they seem to me important. First, if one commits an immediate wrong and thereby fails to fulfill a remote 
obligation, then one commits a remote wrong. Thus it is in virtue of their immediate wrongdoings that Smith 
and Green cannot escape the charge that they did wrong in not fulfilling their remote obligations. Second, as 
noted in Section I, one commits a remote wrong only if one commits an immediate wrong. Thus, if one commits 
a remote wrong, one has in a sense brought it on oneself. And, generalizing on Green's case, we may say: if one 
is in a genuine moral bind, one has put oneself there.
14 
 
NOTES 
1. See, e.g., [7], p. 106; [12], p. 85; [13], p. 197; [14], p. 252; [16], p. 149. 
2. See [2], p. 64. 
3. In [5], pp. 208-9, Alvin Goldman ascribes a double time-index to "can"-contexts but not to "ought"-
contexts and thus fails to see that the thesis that "ought" implies "can" is open to the sort of easy rescue 
that I am about to articulate. It should be noted that this way of expressing the thesis that "ought" implies 
"can" is not novel. It is explicit in Holly Goldman's treatment of "ought" in [6]; it is implicit in 
Feldman's treatment of "ought" in [4] and McKinsey's in [10]; and the distinction between time of 
"ought" and time of action is also explicitly endorsed by Castaneda in [1] and by other philosophers. 
Contrast Prichard in [11], pp. 182-3. 
4. This is not, of course, to say that the present case proves the thesis true; but it does confirm it, I think. 
5. The question arises: just when is the remote wrong committed, Saturday night or Sunday? My use of 
"then and there" indicates what I think is the proper answer to this question: Saturday night. (That is, 
Smith did wrong on Saturday night in not repaying the loan on Sunday.) Otherwise we would have to 
say that Smith did wrong in not repaying the loan at a time (Sunday) when he was not obligated to repay 
the loan, and this seems incoherent. 
6. See [4] and [6]. 
7. See [8]; [9]; [15]; and [17], Chapter 11. 
8. See [3]. 
9. [3], p. 91. 
10. I think that there are in fact serious problems with this assumption, but I shall not enter into these here. 
My aim is to put the case for moral dilemmas in the best light possible, short of granting that they can 
really arise. 
11. I say "can" (rather than "would"), since (B1) involves "only if' and not "if." (But see note 10 above.) 
Given the appropriateness of feeling guilty, it would be appropriate for Green in the former case to feel 
guilty from Sunday on; in the latter case, from Saturday noon on. (See note 5 above.) 
12. Thus there seems to me to be an important link between prima facie and conditional obligation, despite 
their being distinct. Cf. [4], pp. 267-8. Note that, prior to suppression, an obligation may be overridden, 
whereas an obligation cannot be suppressed and then overridden. 
13. I am indebted to a referee for this point. 
14. My thanks to Earl Conee, Philip Quinn, and Ernest Sosa for comments on an earlier draft.  
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